The co-dictators Rosario Murillo and Daniel Ortega face an uncomfortable but inevitable reality. The United States (U.S.) is implementing a firmer hemispheric strategy. The military extraction of Nicolás Maduro and Cilia Flores in January 2026, the subsequent oil embargo against Cuba, joint military operations against criminal groups in Ecuador, and diplomatic pressure on Mexico to act more forcefully against drug cartels confirm that Washington’s posture toward the region has entered a new phase.
We are now seeing growing attention on Nicaragua from Trump’s team. In this context, it is likely that the Nicaraguan co-dictators will receive increasing attention week by week.
Nicolás Maduro learned this lesson too late. For the former Venezuelan autocrat, there was a moment when negotiations could have saved him. He had the opportunity to step down with a measure of dignity and retain some degree of influence over Venezuela’s future after a negotiated political transition. Instead, Maduro’s miscalculation closed that window and ultimately led him to New York, where he and his wife are now detained facing criminal charges. Maduro surely now regrets not recognizing the warning signs.
Nicaragua’s despots may still have time to avoid repeating the mistake of Maduro and Flores. But time, as the latter discovered, is the one strategic asset authoritarian leaders never truly control. The question is whether Ortega and Murillo — and especially their children — will participate in building the inevitable change that every generation demands or wait for it to be imposed on them with all the consequences that entails.
For years Nicolás Maduro pursued a strategy of resistance. He believed — as Ortega and Murillo believe today — that by consolidating control over the armed forces, the police, and the judiciary, while repressing the opposition and relying on allies such as Cuba, Russia, Iran, and China, his government could indefinitely withstand external pressure.
However, the international community repeatedly presented him with opportunities to negotiate. In particular, during the last 15 months, the Trump administration offered Maduro several opportunities to step aside safely and facilitate a political transition in Venezuela.
One of the most important efforts in that regard occurred through Richard Grenell, Donald Trump’s special envoy for special missions. In January 2025, Grenell traveled to Caracas and met with Maduro at the presidential palace in what became one of the most significant discreet diplomatic channels between Washington and Caracas. Grenell’s mission demonstrated that even after years of confrontation, the United States was still willing to explore transactional diplomacy. Donald Trump, through Richard Grenell, made it clear that Maduro had the option of a peaceful exit.
During that visit, Grenell secured the release of six U.S. citizens held in Venezuelan prisons and offered Maduro a different path. There is no doubt that Grenell presented firm demands, but even Venezuelans acknowledged that he was promoting a peaceful diplomatic route. More importantly, discussions through that discreet channel explored broader arrangements that could have allowed Maduro to avoid a catastrophic outcome.
But Maduro did not negotiate seriously. He attempted to extract concessions while continuing to consolidate power internally. Negotiations dragged on without decisive progress. Eventually, the diplomatic channel closed, tensions intensified, and the crisis entered a much more dangerous phase that ended with Maduro’s capture during a U.S. military operation after months of confrontation. By that point, the opportunity to negotiate a controlled exit had disappeared. Maduro’s final mistake was not refusing to talk, but waiting too long to act.
Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo now risk repeating the mistake of their Venezuelan counterparts under even less favorable circumstances. Unlike Venezuela, Nicaragua does not possess strategic oil reserves capable of influencing global energy markets. Venezuela’s oil wealth gave Maduro room to maneuver and led many international actors to act cautiously for fear of destabilizing the country.
Nicaragua does not have that buffer. The country’s economy is small and its geopolitical importance is limited. In fact, for years Ortega and Murillo used these realities to their advantage, keeping Washington relatively at bay through small, carefully timed concessions that allowed them to buy time.
However, in the current context those same conditions make Nicaragua’s dictatorship easier to pressure. International measures can be applied with far fewer consequences for the global economy.
Worse still, Ortega and Murillo have systematically closed nearly all internal channels that could facilitate a negotiated transition. In practice, they have transformed Nicaragua’s political system into a family-based authoritarian structure.
Around the world, the United States has begun to show a greater willingness to confront adversarial regimes directly. Developments related to Iran, the renewed focus on security, and recent events in Venezuela and Cuba point toward a harder strategic posture. Within this environment, Nicaragua increasingly appears as a small but symbolically relevant point in a broader geopolitical competition.
Alliances with Russia, Iran, and China no longer offer the guarantees that Ortega and Murillo might expect. Maduro believed that his external alliances would secure his survival. Events proved otherwise.
Today, Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo find themselves at a crossroads that closely resemble the one faced by Nicolás Maduro and Cilia Flores just a few months ago. Ortega and Murillo would do well to study that outcome carefully and recognize what is unavoidable.
