Editorial

Nicaragua’s Gold Sector: Transparency in Words, Confiscation in Practice

As the Ortega-Murillo regime defends its gold mining policies as transparent and lawful, documented evidence raises serious questions

Last Saturday, February 21, the Attorney General’s Office — controlled by the Ortega-Murillo family — issued a statement defending itself against what it described as “malicious publications that seek to misinform about the development and well-being that our nation has achieved and continues to promote.” In that note, it attempts to build the narrative that mining in Nicaragua is a sector governed by due process, transparency, legal certainty, and strict environmental oversight.

The problem is that the recent reality, documented with names, dates, official resolutions, and reports published in LA PRENSA and other independent media, shows exactly the opposite. If the official account were true, the case of BHMB Mining Nicaragua S.A. simply would not have occurred.

BHMB was not a shell company or an informal operator. It was founded in 2019 with foreign investment belonging to a U.S. company, duly registered as foreign direct investment with the Central Bank of Nicaragua (BCN). It legally processed gold and regularly exported to the United States. It held valid environmental and regulatory permits. It generated more than 120 direct jobs in the country. And yet it was shut down. Its assets were confiscated. Its facilities were occupied.

BHMB possesses videos of the arbitrary occupation of its plant. The footage shows legal representatives of local and Chinese companies associated with the ruling family’s circle forcibly entering, breaking chains and locks, expelling security personnel, and taking physical control of the premises. The company also has recordings identifying the participants and vehicle registration records used during the takeover.

Among the main figures in that occupation are Aníbal Vladimir Matus Buitrago, Chunqing Sun, and Feiwu Bian, who repeatedly appear in La Gaceta as representatives of Santa Rita Mining and Zhong Fu Development, companies linked to the circle of power. During the takeover, Chinese nationals wearing T-shirts bearing the Zhong Fu Development logo also participated.

These same companies and their representatives have received concessions and regulatory advantages officially published, many stemming from transfers carried out by sanctioned entities or “voluntarily returned” by foreign operators. Both individuals also hold relevant positions in the Nicaragua-China Chamber of Commerce (CCNC), an organization created under the regime following the closure of AmCham.

It is difficult to reconcile these facts with the narrative of respect for foreign investment proclaimed by the Attorney General’s Office. The statement insists that the sector is transparent because concessions are published in La Gaceta. But transparency does not consist of publishing resolutions; it consists of explaining the reasoning behind decisions and the pattern they reveal.

The statement also does not explain why, after U.S. sanctions against Eniminas, Comintsa, and Capital Mining, concessions began migrating to a group of Chinese-Nicaraguan companies with no significant mining track record — Santa Rita, Zhong Fu, XinXin, Thomas Metal — nor why in 2025 export regulations were modified so that this same group concentrated the purchase of artisanal gold, creating a functional monopoly capable of controlling local prices and capturing extraordinary margins.

But that is not all. Since 2020, according to formal statements from owners of foreign companies operating in the sector, they were required — in addition to their legal tax obligations — to pay 5 percent of their gross revenues through fictitious contracts with companies linked to the ruling circle, such as Suministro y Montaje Electromecánico. They were also forced to withhold an additional 5 percent on artisanal gold purchases to transfer to Capital Mining, now sanctioned by the United States, and pressured to cede up to 20 percent of their shares to individuals designated by the Minister of Energy and Mines. Some companies rejected those demands. Others, under pressure, had to comply.

The government statement asserts that companies comply with their tax obligations and that there are no formal complaints regarding unfair competition. But when a foreign operator who refuses to pay informal commissions ends up closed and occupied by competitors linked to those in power, the absence of complaints ceases to be an indicator of harmony and becomes an indicator of risk.

There is also talk of strict supervision and controls. However, multiple investigations describe a circuit in which artisanal gold is purchased in cash, processed in plants under control of the official network, and exported through politically aligned companies. That is not an open market; it is a vertically integrated structure.

Gold today is not simply a natural resource in Nicaragua. It is a strategic financial instrument in a context of international sanctions. After the collapse of the Petrocaribe scheme, the regime needed a new source of foreign currency. Gold came to fulfill that role, and now the regime — fearful of further sanctions against the sector that has become a source of revenue — wants to make it appear that everything it does is transparent and lawful.

When the official statement claims that national and foreign investors operate with full legal certainty, the BHMB case demonstrates that such certainty is conditional. It depends on political alignment and willingness to integrate into the dominant scheme.

The final irony is evident: the statement seeks to reassure the United States and avoid further sanctions on the gold sector, while a U.S.-backed investment has been subjected to closure, expulsion, and armed occupation. That is not only legal insecurity; it is also cynicism.

What is really happening is not what the regime claims in a statement that only they believe. Between the official discourse and the documented facts there exists a profound gap — a narrative reminiscent of other episodes in which those in power labeled massive peaceful protests as a “coup attempt,” protests that were crushed with savage repression that left hundreds of innocent young people dead, whom the regime called vandals.

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