There are moments in the history of institutions when a crisis compels us to remember why they were created in the first place. The upcoming Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Organization of American States (OAS) is one of those moments. Faced with the accelerated dismantling of democracy in the region, inaction not only affects countries undergoing crisis; it also threatens to render the inter-American legal order itself ineffective.
Beyond what may occur on October 2, there is a question that the entire continent should ask itself: What kind of OAS do we want? The answer does not lie in the political sphere, but rather in law, in the institutional history of the inter-American system, and in the commitments that the States themselves have sovereignly undertaken within this forum.
Within that history, there is a precedent that is difficult to ignore. In 1995, during the Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas in Williamsburg, Virginia, the then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nicaragua, Dr. José Bernard Pallais, presented an approach that became an international point of reference by identifying the need to construct a new model that understands security as a phenomenon inseparable from democracy, human rights, development, and cooperation.
Thirty years later, that proposal acquires unexpected relevance. The central question before the inter-American system is precisely this: can democracy, human rights, stability, and security continue to be addressed as independent matters?.
For much of the twentieth century, hemispheric security was understood through the logic of military threats, armed conflicts, and territorial defense. However, this conception progressively evolved through an advanced legal framework: General Assembly Resolution AG/RES. 1080 of 1991, which created a collective mechanism to respond to events that interrupt the democratic institutional political process or the legitimate exercise of power; the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which establishes that democracy is not exhausted by the electoral act, but encompasses the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, political pluralism, and the separation and independence of powers – that is, democracy as a limitation on the exercise of power is an indispensable condition for security and development in the region; the 2002 Bridgetown Declaration; and the 2003 Declaration on Security in the Americas. Taken together, these instruments established a clear doctrine: security is multidimensional, and there can be no regional security without its essential components, namely democratic institutions and respect for human rights.
This does not mean that every political tension requires continental intervention, but neither does it mean that the dismantling of democratic institutions and systematic violations of human rights constitute a “strictly internal matter” when their spillover effects transcend national borders. This is at the heart of the discussion regarding Nicaragua before the OAS: a crisis ceases to be domestic when there is a collective regional commitment to defending democratic values and human dignity. Therefore, collective action is not an act of political discretion, but a legal obligation arising from the inter-American legal order itself. The disruption of democratic order is, by definition, a matter of multilateral concern and consequence.
The facts speak for themselves. The Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua (GHREN) has documented the persistence of serious human rights violations, concluding that crimes against humanity have been committed in the country. It has also warned that the arbitrary deprivation of nationality, enforced disappearances, deaths in custody, dispossession of property, and political and religious persecution have extended beyond Nicaragua’s borders. To this, we must add the cruelty of the illegitimate Ortega-Murillo regime in turning thousands of citizens into “de facto stateless persons,” arbitrarily transferring the impact of its repression to other countries, where they are left to confront the consequences of this situation.
Along the same lines, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) has documented acts of surveillance, harassment, threats, violence, and killings against Nicaraguans abroad, as well as the abusive use of international cooperation mechanisms for purposes of political persecution. In August, the Commission warned that transnational repression and forced migration pose “serious security challenges for the region” and urged member states to activate the mechanisms of the OAS Charter, the Inter-American Democratic Charter, and the relevant legal instruments. The granting of precautionary measures to ten Nicaraguan exiles in Costa Rica, only days before the Meeting of Consultation, confirms the gravity and urgency of the situation experienced by Nicaraguans both within and outside the country.
It is true that state sovereignty and non-intervention are pillars of the international order. However, sovereignty is not a blank check. The American states have sovereignly undertaken common obligations concerning democracy. Collectively assessing a situation that openly violates those commitments does not constitute undue interference in the internal affairs of another state, but rather a legitimate obligation of multilateral oversight aimed at safeguarding security in the hemisphere.
The fundamental challenge is to ensure that respect for sovereignty does not become an act of complicity. The OAS must “act” beyond expressions of condemnation in the face of a situation that the member states themselves have characterized as “urgent and of common concern”.
The normative framework for addressing Nicaragua’s grave situation already exists. Nothing needs to be created: the OAS Charter, Resolution 1080, the Inter-American Democratic Charter, the Bridgetown Declaration, and the Declaration on Security in the Americas, among other precedents, support the principle of multidimensional security, which is a development of the inter-American system, and oblige it to act collectively in the case of Nicaragua.
Thus, the fundamental question remains: What kind of organization do we want? We do not need an OAS that acts above or outside the law, but neither do we need one that takes refuge in the law in order to evade its responsibilities. We require an OAS that uses law as a living instrument to activate collective action; a multilateral organization prepared to exert firm and effective pressure to promote the conditions necessary for the beginning of a genuine democratic transition in Nicaragua. We need an organization capable of countering impunity, disavowing the authoritarian constitutional reforms imposed by the illegitimate Ortega-Murillo regime (2025/2026), and protecting neighboring states from the regime’s transnational repressive onslaught. An OAS that understands that the dismantling of democratic institutions and systematic human rights violations are not ancillary matters, but fundamental premises of regional security.
The strength of an international institution is not measured by the number of rules it accumulates, but by its capacity and courage to apply those rules when they are most needed. More than six million lives are trapped under the cruelty of a regime that seeks to remain in power by eliminating the sovereign right of citizens to freely choose their leaders. Demonstrating that the inter-American legal framework is effective in restoring representative democracy, human rights, and the security of our peoples is the mandate that the OAS faces today in the case of Nicaragua.
The author is a Doctor of Law from the University of Alcalá (Spain) and a Nicaraguan jurist forced into exile.
