Daniel Ortega won a second non-consecutive term in the November 2006 elections. He had won with 37.99 percent of the vote; the lowest percentage he had received in the five presidential campaigns he had participated in up to that point. Following his victory in 1984, the rest had only been defeats: 1990, 1996, and 2001.
Ortega had only won due to two factors he orchestrated during the 16 years he was out of power: through a pact with the liberal leader Arnoldo Alemán, he lowered the threshold to win an election from 45 percent to 35 percent, and that same pact caused the liberals to split into two nearly equal factions. One faction secured 27.11 percent of the vote, while the other obtained 28.30 percent.
But his victory was limited. The Constitution, amended in 1995, did not allow him to run for office ever again, as it not only prohibited consecutive re-election but also barred anyone who had already served two terms as president from running.
Ortega was supposed to step down in January 2012, but he had other plans—he wanted to remain president until his last breath. In an interview, he had declared that he hoped to live “at least” as long as his mother, who died in 2005 at the age of 97. With a divided opposition and a business sector that had received Ortega’s promise to let them conduct their affairs as long as they stayed out of politics, the Catholic Church, represented by the bishops of the Episcopal Conference (CEN), became the biggest thorn in Ortega’s side. Although he repeatedly tried to neutralize them as well.
2009-2010: “We are concerned about the unconstitutionality into which our institutions have fallen
The narrow electoral victory in 2006 had given the Sandinista Front only 36 seats in the National Assembly, out of a total of 92. The liberals had 54 votes, and although they were deeply divided, they were not about to open the door to continuous re-election for Ortega.
Inspired by a resolution from the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Costa Rica, Ortega turned to the Constitutional Chamber of Nicaragua’s Supreme Court, claiming that the prohibition of re-election violated his human rights. However, in the Constitutional Chamber, Ortega also lacked a majority, and the liberals refused to give him their votes. Setting aside formalities and legalities, on October 19, 2009, the Chamber, led by magistrate Rafael Solís, convened at night in the absence of the liberals and, with an illegally constituted majority, “approved” Ortega’s appeal.
On April 23, 2010, the Episcopal Conference (CEN) issued a statement “in light of the national reality,” in which they expressed concern over “the latest political developments, fully aware of the gravity of certain acts that violate our Political Constitution and show disrespect for the country’s institutional framework. We must be convinced that only respect for institutions and the rule of law can ensure a peaceful and democratic coexistence that permanently guarantees governance, public security, and social progress,” the bishops declared.
“We are deeply concerned about the unconstitutionality and illegality into which some of our democratic institutions have fallen, for we cannot forget that ‘a true democracy is possible only in a State of Law’ and that ‘a democracy without values easily turns into overt or covert totalitarianism, as history shows’ (Centesimus Annus, 46). Institutions should not be instruments in the hands of those who govern to transform their abuses and ambitions for power into legally justified forms and actions,” the CEN warned.
Ortega did not heed the bishops’ warnings, and that ruling by the Constitutional Chamber was ratified by the Full Court, controlled by the Sandinistas, on September 30, 2010, clearing the path for him to run for re-election, even though Article 147 explicitly prohibited it.
The “Full Court” had also been composed of magistrates whose terms had expired, and since the Sandinista Front did not have the votes in the National Assembly to re-elect them, Ortega, through another maneuver, decided to “prolong” their terms indefinitely.
2011-2014: The Reforms “favor the establishment and perpetuation of absolute power
Ortega was elected in November 2011 in an election that the European Union Election Observation Mission described as “opaque.” All these unconstitutional acts led LA PRENSA to label Ortega as “unconstitutional president” whenever referring to him during the 2012-2017 period.
The vote count had not allowed national and international election observers to verify the results. The director of the national observation organization Ipade, Mauricio Zúniga, said shortly after the elections: “It is impossible to audit these data as there is no official source from the CSE (that provides) data by Voting Reception Boards as mandated by Article 129 of the Electoral Law.”
In its message of November 16, 2011, titled “On the electoral Results,” the Episcopal Conference stated: “The legitimacy of the electoral process and the respect for the will of the people have been completely called into question. As believers, we hold the firm conviction that any dishonest action that undermines the sovereignty of the people is not merely an ethically negative fact but something reprehensible in the eyes of God, who expects civil authorities to be the first to ‘know the law’ (Micah 3:1), that is, the first to respect and enforce the demands of justice.”
Legalizing future re-elections
Ortega needed to “legalize” his future re-elections. In 2011, he ensured, through a vote count under his control, that he had enough deputies to reform the Constitution and establish indefinite re-election. Ortega “won” with 62.46 percent of the vote, resulting in 63 Sandinista deputies out of a total of 92.
After inaugurating his unconstitutional term in January 2012, Ortega could proceed with this reform. But it was not the only reform he was interested in. The “dialogue and consensus” model with the business sector was working very well for him, and he wanted to give it constitutional status. The business community was happy, the opposition was increasingly weakened by division, and only the CEN kept pressing the issue.
In their message of November 22, 2013, the bishops said: “We believe that the current proposed reforms to the Constitution, viewed as a whole, are aimed at favoring the establishment and perpetuation of absolute power in the long term, exercised by a person or a party in a dynastic manner or through a political and economic oligarchy.
“The bishops of the Episcopal Conference of Nicaragua do not agree with this constitutional reform project. We believe that its approval will bring no benefit to the nation.”
The reforms were approved in the first legislature on December 10, 2013.
Ortega Seeks to Neutralize the Bishops
In response to the bishops’ pressure regarding the constitutional reforms, Ortega took advantage of the visit in December of the Cardinal Primate of America, Nicolás López Rodríguez, during the celebration of the centenary of the ecclesiastical province of Nicaragua, to propose a dialogue with the bishops.
At the end of the lunch hosted by Ortega, he stood up and, on his own initiative, delivered some “brief” remarks, promising that “this could be the beginning of new meetings… and that he is open to dialogue,” as detailed to LA PRENSA by Auxiliary Bishop of Managua, Monsignor Silvio Báez, on December 5, 2013.
The invitation to dialogue raised concerns about the fact that Ortega was advancing in his control of the country and might also be trying to control the bishops. Former liberal deputy José Pallais warned at the time that “Ortega only opens up spaces for dialogue when he is compelled by reality and the depth of crises,” making it hard to believe that he was changing.
At that time, Báez maintained that he “wanted to believe in the president,” and assured that the bishops are neither enemies of the government, nor political opposition, nor adversaries. Instead, their criticisms aimed to improve the procedures and decisions being made in the country.
The meeting at the Nunciature on May 21, 2014
The bishops took the invitation to dialogue very seriously. They analyzed and weighed the opportunities and threats of the meeting, and in March 2014 decided to accept. However, it would be another two months before they actually met. On May 21, at the Apostolic Nunciature in Managua, the bishops of the Episcopal Conference met with Ortega and Murillo. They handed over a 15-page letter outlining the points of interest for the dialogue that was beginning.
The document addressed topics ranging from the family to their concerns about the then-vicariate of Bluefields, their worries about human rights abuses, evangelization, government policies, and institutional integrity.
Regarding the last point, they stated: “Since the outcome of the 2011 elections, the concentration of power, governmental corruption, the confusion between State and Party, the subjugation of State powers to the Executive’s will, disrespect for laws, lack of legal security, influence peddling, political intolerance, control over almost all municipal governments in the country, and up to the recent constitutional reforms, have alarmingly worsened the current situation of the country and its future.”
Two “unacceptable” proposals: open dialogue with the opposition and “giving his word of honor” to hold free elections
“In light of the current political and institutional situation, we wish to make two concrete proposals with the best of intentions, which we are sure our people will welcome with hope and joy.”
“The first is the establishment of a ‘Grand National Dialogue’ involving all sectors of the country. The bishops had already proposed in our letter of April 23, 2010, a path of ‘transparent and trustworthy dialogues’ between the Government, opposition parties, and civil society, aimed at achieving understanding among various sectors of society and crystallizing into a genuine democratic consensus and a new social pact that ensures political, legal, social, and economic stability for the country and addresses the major problems facing the population.”
“We respectfully urge you, Mr. President, to open up to dialogue with all sectors of the nation, to embrace other opinions, and to start by demonstrating your goodwill in this regard, beginning with offering periodic press conferences without discrimination against non-official media.”
The second proposal that we, as the Episcopal Conference, make to the Government, despite having already appointed or re-elected the members of the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE), is to initiate a profound political reform of the entire electoral system of the country.
“We respectfully request that you give your word of honor to guarantee a completely transparent and honest presidential electoral process for Nicaragua in 2016, with new and honorable members at the helm of the CSE, where the will of the people shines without any doubt; with an independent identification system separate from the CSE that ensures each Nicaraguan receives their identification card in a timely manner before the elections; and with an electoral process fully open to observers from national and international institutions.”
The attempt to neutralize the bishops had failed. The bishops never received a response from Ortega.
Ortega continued with the process of concentrating power and was re-elected in 2016, with virtually no opposition since he had eliminated it through his control of the Supreme Electoral Council and the Supreme Court of Justice. His preferred mechanism up to that point was to revoke the legal status of organizations where the real opposition was grouped. The 2016 elections saw a turnout of over 60 percent abstention; the population had lost faith in the process, which they deemed a farce.
The protests of 2018
As former deputy Pallais had predicted, Ortega sought dialogue when he was “compelled by reality and the depth of the crises” of the social explosion in April 2018. The unrest began with protests against the draconian reforms to the Social Security system but, due to the regime’s violent response, spread throughout the country. Roads were blocked by 60 percent, and the main cities were taken over by the protesters.
After years of silence, Ortega once again called on the Episcopal Conference. This time, it was not the CEN proposing dialogue, but Ortega himself. Despite his violent repression of the protesters, he was unable to regain control. The CEN agreed to mediate between the dictator and a loosely organized mass of protesters who had hastily come together under the umbrella of the Civic Alliance for Justice and Democracy.
The dialogue began on May 16, a month after the start of the protests, but the repression did not stop, and it soon became clear that Ortega was merely buying time. On June 7, the CEN presented Ortega with a dialogue agenda “to democratize” the country, aiming to end the violence. Essentially, the bishops were revisiting the points they had been highlighting for years.
In a brief communiqué on June 8th the bishops explained: “We have delivered the proposal that reflects the feelings of many sectors of Nicaraguan society and expresses the desire of the vast majority of the population. We await your written response as soon as possible”.
Ortega responded by accusing the Episcopal Conference of attempting to stage a coup and intensified the repression. Since then, the repression has not ceased; Nicaraguans have lost all their freedoms, nearly 800,000 have left the country, and the regime has exiled over 150 priests, including three bishops, representing 25 percent of the country’s clergy.
To this day, Ortega’s goal of remaining in power until his last breath seems achievable.