In its coverage of the 47th anniversary of the Nicaraguan Army this Wednesday, September 2, LA PRENSA —noting the promotion of Colonel Jimmy Alfredo Guevara to the rank of brigadier general— called attention to the «aging of the military high command.»
«Guevara’s appointment becomes the latest change in a military high command where nothing actually changes. It is an establishment that is increasingly aging and subservient to the dictators,» noted LA PRENSA’s news report on the celebration of the Army’s anniversary, which was presided over by the likewise elderly co-dictators, Ortega and Murillo.
In reality, military commanders everywhere in the world grow old. In the same way, all people age, not just those at the helm of public institutions and social organizations.
That is precisely why all militaries maintain retirement procedures and regular renewal mechanisms, which safeguard them from the decrepitude of their leadership and guarantee continuous revitalization. Consequently, high-ranking military commanders everywhere serve fixed terms in office, at the end of which they must enter retirement.
Furthermore, the periodic renewal of high command serves to prevent any single individual from accumulating excessive power and influence within the military institution. It also reinforces military education regarding the principle of obedience to civilian authority and state laws. Moreover, it allows fresh, updated leaders to assume command to meet the evolving challenges facing the military establishment.
However, the problem of the aging high command in the Nicaraguan Army stems directly from the dictatorship’s elimination of regular renewal procedures, thereby blocking the advancement of new officers—whether young or less senior—who are thoroughly trained and modernized.
In their unhealthy obsession with perpetuating themselves in power, the dictators dismantled the regular process of renewing and strengthening the military leadership, aiming to tie the institution’s fate directly to their own. That process of institutional renewal originally began under the democratic administration of President Violeta Barrios de Chamorro and developed successfully through the two subsequent democratic governments, until Ortega regained power and halted the healthy, periodic turnover of the high command.
Now, when addressing the role of the Army, we are not merely referring to its current function, nor to its role during the democratic era from 1990 to 2006, nor to the subsequent years after Daniel Ortega reclaimed power and set about restoring the Sandinista dictatorship.
We are referring to the role the Army could and should play right now. Reports by the UN Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua (GHREN) present evidence that during the regime’s violent crackdown against citizens in 2018, certain Army structures and personnel provided intelligence, lethal weaponry, and undercover operatives who collaborated with the National Police and pro-regime paramilitary groups.
Nevertheless, as an institution, the Army took care not to become openly and directly involved in the massive repression. In fact, the military leadership initially voiced support for a peaceful resolution to the crisis, though it later submitted to the dictates of the dictators.
The truth is that had the Army stood alongside the Nicaraguan people in April 2018, the dictatorship would have come to an end. The Army committed a historic blunder at that junction, a terrible historic mistake, but it could now rectify it and serve as a decisive catalyst for the political change necessary to restore democracy.
Democracy greatly benefits and is also deeply in the Army’s best interest. In addition to restoring the normal dynamics of internal succession, the institution would regain its honorable, nonpolitical, and professional character, its moral standing in society, and the genuine respect of the citizenry.
This reality appears to be recognized by center-right democratic opposition parties and movements. In their recently presented Plan for an Orderly Transition to Democracy, they do not propose abolishing the Army —as radical factions suggest—, but rather purging and restructuring it, including the appointment of «a new Military Leadership.»
That is the correct path. Moreover, the restoration of freedom and democracy is a monumental task that must not fall solely on civilian democratic opponents. It must also be a responsibility borne by the Army, through which —to reiterate— it would recover its dignity and institutional integrity. It would reclaim its role as defender not only of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, but also of the freedom, democracy, and human rights of all Nicaraguans.
To some, expecting this from the military might seem naive. Yet in politics and throughout the course of historical events, anything can happen—even that which seemed impossible right up until the moment it occurred.
